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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the fairness doctrine has been eliminated in the United
States as of 1987,' the idea of regulating speech concerning issues of pub-
lic disagreement continues to stir a lively academic and legal debate.
* LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem; M.S., Boston University; Ph.D., Rutgers
University. Director of Legal Affairs and International Relations, Israel Broadcasting
Authority (1993-97); Lecturer, Tel Aviv University, Gershon H. Gordon Faculty of Social
Science, Department of Communication.
1. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH Syracuse,
New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
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However, in Israel, the reason for this debate emanates from the fact
that not only has the doctrine not been eliminated, it has in fact taken on a
life of its own. Still, it does not always take into account where the doc-
trine has come from, what it really meant, and how it is suited to the Israeli
legal logic. Following a series of legal decisions and administrative acts,
the doctrine has been redesigned in a manner that does not resemble its
North American origins, although it still carries its name.
This regulatory regime, imported from one legal system and im-
planted in another, continues to develop a new nature in Israel and is in it-
self an interesting cross-cultural phenomenon. It is even more intriguing
because its original adoption was formed from case law, and only later has
it taken an administrative form. Still, case law determines the doctrine's
nature, redefining it, and questioning the ability to stretch it beyond its ex-
isting boundaries.
Interestingly enough, had the development of the doctrine been tested
in a court of law in its country of origin, it could have been found uncon-
stitutional, as the constitutional safeguards in both societies are different.
In that sense, the fairness doctrine as implanted in the Israeli system is like
a sandwich from McDonald's-it bears the same name, looks, and tastes
like the original, but the meat is local and so is the cook. Thus, the sand-
wich claims to be of similar standards to its foreign counterpart, but its in-
gredients are local. Its popularity stems much from its American origin,
even though other types of imports from systems of less glamour may
better fit the local culture.
This Article describes the fairness doctrine and how it is different
from impartiality, another form of speech regulation. Further, this Article
briefly paints the structure of Israeli media law, the new environment in
which the doctrine has been implanted. Finally, the unique character of the
Israeli fairness doctrine and its American roots, planted in its continental
ground, is analyzed, and its current situation is critiqued.
II. DEFINING FAIRNESS
In order to be able to deduce whether a particular legal term has been
adopted by a foreign legal system, the original setting of the term must be
analyzed. The fairness doctrine, developed and applied in the United States
between 1934 and 1987, is a well-defined legal and policy term. It is based
on a particular logic: The U.S. Constitution safeguards freedom of expres-
541 (1987), afftd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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sion and of the press.2 Still, due to the fact that broadcasting is a medium
of expression that only a small number of license holders may use due to
technical scarcity, it may be regulated. At the same time, a unique feature
of the U.S. system has always been that once a license to broadcast is
awarded, the license holder may use the airwaves to promote his or her
own opinion. The doctrine, thus, was created in order to make sure that the
highest bidders were not the only parties able to communicate their views
on public issues.3 The doctrine originally consisted of two types of regula-
tions imposed upon broadcast licensees: first, the regulation on broadcast-
ers to focus on issues concerning political speech, that is the type of speech
• 4
that deals with the day-to-day issues in public disagreement; second, the
regulation of personal attacks and the means by which one can remedy an
unflattering portrayal by the broadcast media.
A. Speech in Instances of Disagreement
1. The American Fairness Doctrine
Different doctrines of regulating the issue of speech in instances of
disagreement have developed for a number of reasons in different legal
systems. The fairness doctrine was the unique approach adopted to regu-
late political speech within the American system, characterized by a large
number of commercial broadcasters. The doctrine's rationale was based on
the idea of spectrum scarcity under which a limited number of outlets are
available to the public. This spectrum scarcity justified regulation of the
station owners' freedom of speech due to the existence of a competing
right, namely the "public convenience, interest or necessity."5 A balancing
of the rights led to a two-pronged doctrine: First, the license holders were
obliged to raise controversial issues. Second, when doing so, they were to
present opposing viewpoints on the matter.
By 1985, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found that
the doctrine's rationale had become obsolete, a decision upheld by the U.S.
2. U.S. CONST. amend I.
3. Red Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
4. Id. at 377.
5. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
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Court of Appeals.6 All attempts since to make the doctrine into law have
failed.
2. The European Rule of Impartiality
In Europe, the rule during the same time period was that in most
countries the dominant broadcaster (and sometimes the only one) was a
national public broadcaster. As such, the broadcasters were obliged to
maintain what can be dubbed the doctrine of impartiality.7 As providers of
a public service, the national broadcasters were not deemed suspects for
evading controversial issues based on commercial considerations or as
promoters of personal agendas. Rather, as public organizations close to the
authorities, they were to be guarded from presenting political reality lop-
sidedly. Thus, impartiality was described as the duty to present issues in an
objective, fair, neutral, pluralist, and comprehensive manner. Such re-
quirements exist in most Western European countries including the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy.
European impartiality is different than the American fairness doctrine
mainly because it prevents the broadcasters from editorializing. In addi-
tion, unlike the case in the United States where the fairness doctrine had
been eliminated, impartiality as such still exists in European systems.
Thus, for example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Producers'
Guidelines state in their current version that "[d]ue impartiality lies at the
heart of the BBC. It is a core value and no area of programming is exempt
from it. It requires programme makers to show open-mindedness, fairness
and a respect for truth."9
At the same time, the regulator for commercial television, the Inde-
pendent Television Commission, states in its Programme Code that:
Licensees may make programmes about any issues they choose.
This freedom is limited only by the obligations of fairness and a re-
spect for truth, two qualities which are essential to all factually-based
programmes, whether on "controversial" topics or not.
Impartiality does not mean that broadcasters have to be abso-
lutely neutral on every controversial issue, but they should deal even-
6. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
7. ERic BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 101-04 (1993).
8. Id.
9. Producers' Guidelines 1996: Impartiality & Accuracy (visited Feb. 15, 1999)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/editorial/prodgl/02.htm#l>.
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handedly with opposing points of view in the arena of democratic de-
bate. Opinion should be clearly distinguished from fact.
10
B. Personal Attacks
Unlike the political fairness doctrine, rules that pertain to unfair re-
porting concerning individuals and that also exist across legal systems are
still being enforced in the United States as well. In the United States, this
type of regulation is known as the personal attack rule and is an extension
of the fairness doctrine. In Europe, this can generally be found under the
heading of right of reply. In the European sense, the right of reply is seen
as a form of fairness. Unlike the American rule, it is not limited to fairness
during the broadcasting of a controversial issue of public importance.
Formulated in the 1960s on the heels of the Red Lion ruling, the
American personal attack rule combines political fairness with fairness to
people acting within the political arena. It thus states that:
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of
public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, in-
tegrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group, the
licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than one
week after the attack, transmit to the persons or group attacked:
(1) Notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast;
(2) A script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not
available) of the attack; and
(3) An offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's
facilities."
Even though the fairness doctrine has been eliminated, the personal attack
rule still exists and has been an issue of contention among FCC officials as
recently as 1998.12
In the United Kingdom, the attack rules are not limited to political
programming. The authority on the matter is the Broadcasting Standards
Commission established by the Broadcasting Act of 1996.13 The Commis-
sion may deal with two types of complaints: Standards complaints have to
do with portrayal of violence and sexual conduct and with matters of taste
10. The ITC Programme Code: 3. Impartiality (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.itc.
org.uk/regulating/prog-reg/progcode/section_3.asp?section=regulating>.
11. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a)(1)-(3) (1997).
12. See Commission Proceeding Regarding the Personal Attack and Political Editorial
Rules, Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. 21,901, 12 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 497 (1998).
13. Broadcasting Act, 1996, ch. 55, § 106 (Eng.).
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and decency generally, while fairness complaints relate to unjust or unfair
treatment or infringement of privacy. 4 In addition, the Independent Televi-
sion Commission (ITC), which regulates content on all television broad-
casts and cablecasts in the United Kingdom, and the BBC, each has its
own code of conduct. The BBC Producers' Guidelines state that:
Where a programme reveals evidence of iniquity or incompetence, or
where a strong, damaging critique of an individual or institution is laid
out, there is a presumption that those criticised be given a fair oppor-
tunity to respond. There may be occasions when this is inappropriate
(usually for legal or overriding ethical reasons) in which case the Head
of Department should be consulted. It may then be appropriate to con-
sider whether an altemative opportunity should be offered for reply at
a subsequent date.1
5
Surprisingly, the ITC Programme Code, published in 1998, does not
contain a similar rule.16 In other European nations, the right of reply has
taken different forms: The narrow Italian right to respond is limited to
factual objective inaccuracies. The French right arises when the broadcast
is only allegedly untrue, but the broadcast must affect the aggrieved
party's honour or dignity. The German right of reply is limited to facts, but
their untruthfulness again need only be alleged, and no evidence of dam-
age to the plaintiff needs to be demonstrated.
7
II. THE STRUCTURE OF ISRAELI MEDIA LAW
Like all aspects of Israeli law, media law combines Knesset' s legisla-
tion, administrative regulation, and court decisions. Print media in Israel
require licenses in order to be published, a remnant of colonial regulations.
In 1953, the Israeli Supreme Court determined that freedom of speech was
a freedom awarded by the Israeli system,' 9 even though the law has, and
continues to, refrain from granting it. As a result, the power of government
to limit freedom of speech, and specifically to close down newspapers, was
limited to instances of clear and present danger to the public safety. In the
formative years of the state, the government solely ran the electronic me-
14. Id.
15. Producers' Guidelines 1996: Impartiality and Accuracy, § 2.7 Right of Reply
(visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.bbc.co.uklinfo/editorial/prodgl/02.htm>.
16. The ITC Programme Code (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http://www.itc.org.uk/
regulating/prog-reg/prog-code/index.asp>.
17. ERic BARENDT, supra note 7, at 162-63.
18. Knesset refers to the Israeli Legislative Assembly.
19. H.C. 73/53, Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior Affairs, 7 P.D. 871.
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dia. In 1965, radio, still the sole electronic medium, was transferred from
government auspices to those of the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA), a
public nongovernmental authority. The IBA acts under the Broadcasting
Authority Law,20 and was the sole broadcaster of both radio and television
(formed in 1968) until the second half of the 1980s, when cable television
franchises were created by the Telecommunications Law of 1986.2' The
Cable Television Council regulates these activities within Israel.22 In 1990,
the Second Authority for Television and Radio Law was enacted, forming
a regulatory regime charged with. a commercial television channel and a
network of commercial regional radio.2 Each of these three media acts,
therefore, under a separate law and separate regulatory bodies, are charged
with regulation. As a result, this structure produces different rules and
regulations for different media.
IV. How THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE BECAME ISRAELI LAW
A. The Written Law and Regulations: Political Speech
The fairness doctrine is not present in the Israeli law books as such.
However, sections of the Broadcasting Authority Law of 1965 and the
Second Authority for Radio and Television Law of 1990 adopt general
principles of political fairness, as do regulations created by the Second
Authority and the Cable Television Council. Still, these are principles of
impartiality in the European sense rather than principles of fairness in the
American one. They call for a fair representation of ideas; they do not
permit editorializing (or rather presenting opinions of owners); and they do
not enforce the raising of controversial issues. As for personal attacks,
those have been dealt with separately and in different ways across Israeli
electronic media. Thus, article 4 of the IBA Law states that "[t]he Author-
ity will ensure that a place for adequate expression of different views and
opinions prevalent in the public will be awarded in the broadcasts, and that
credible information will be broadcast."24
20. Broadcasting Authority Law, 1965, S.H. 106.
21. Telecommunications Law (amend. no. 4), 1986, S.H. 224.
22. As of January 1998, it is the Cable and Satellite Council. See Law for the Amplifi-
cation of Growth and Employment and the Achievement of Budgetary Goals, 1998, S.H.
48.
23. Second Authority for Television and Radio Law, 1990, S.H. 59.
24. Broadcasting Authority Law, 1965, S.H. 106.
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This directive, together with article 2 of the law in which the Author-
ity's service was defined as a national, thus nonpartisan service,2 differs
immensely from the American idea of fairness. First, there is no require-
ment for the raising of controversial issues. The contrary is true, only
prevalent opinions in the public need be represented. Second, the require-
ment of balance refers to the totality of the broadcasts and is not limited to
issues that are controversial. Third, there is no reference whatsoever to
personal attacks and the rules pertaining to them. The IBA's code of con-
26duct, Guidelines for Broadcasting News and Current Affairs, interprets
this rule as one of impartiality by stating that "[b]eyond the word of the
law the Authority has no voice, policy or point of view of its own. The
Authority does not broadcast 'editorials.' The role of the Authority and its
employees is to let different voices speak for themselves."27
Although these internal guidelines resemble and are drawn from
European codes of conduct, they contain reference to political fairness un-
der the heading of fairness doctrine. They state that the fairness doctrine
provides the right of reply to parties in dispute, but its main purpose is to
ensure the public's right to receive full and reliable information alongside
28balanced and varied opinions. The means of achieving this fairness are by
"[s]oliciting the opposing opinion, [f]airly notifying the public if comment
was refused, [u]sing 'newsworthiness' as the measure for professional de-
cisions, [and] [a]voiding becoming 'tools of response' for professional
'reaction teams."' 29
When the Second Authority Law was legislated in 1990, Israeli leg-
islators chose a somewhat different wording for the Authority's require-
ment of balanced broadcasts. Article 5, which lists the Authority's supervi-
sory obligations, includes two specific obligations. Article 5(b)(6) and (7)
require that in fulfilling its duty the Authority will aim to: "(6) [p]rovide
an adequate expression to the cultural diversity of Israeli society and to
25. The phrase used in the law, Mamlakhti, is untranslatable to English. It reflects the
Ben Gurionist ideology of nonpartisanship.
26. Also known as the "Nakdi Document" after their originator, Nakdimon Rogel, the
guidelines have been published by the Broadcasting Authority in the 1990s in the format of
a book to which the legal appendix was written by the undersigned. NAKDIMON ROGEL &
AMrr M. SCHEJTER, THE NAKDI DocuMENT: GUIDELINES FOR BROADCASTING NEws AND
CURRENT AFFAmS (1995).
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Id. at31.
[Vol. 51
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN ISRAEL
different views prevalent in society[, and] (7) broadcast balanced, fair and• . • ,30
credible information." In addition, article 47 states that in a broadcast on
issues of the day whose content has public significance an adequate ex-
31pression to different opinions prevalent among the public will be given.
The Second Authority's ethical regulations stipulate that on issues of
public significance, a broadcaster will allow an adequate and balanced ex-
pression of different opinions prevalent in the public and will not favor one
opinion over others, thus merely repeating the dictate of the law.32 In addi-
tion, under the heading non-favoritism, the regulators maintain that license
holders will ensure their broadcasts will not, directly or indirectly, advance
their personal, economic, or public interest.
33
These provisions are even less reminiscent of the American concept.
According to Broadcasting Authority law, fairness and balance have been
set for information only, while as far as opinion is concerned, the views
that are prevalent and different should be given adequate expression. In
addition, it should be noticed that the balance of opinions required by the
law pertains only to news and to issues deemed significant. By not allow-
ing a license holder to advance his or her own public interest, editorializ-
ing becomes impossible.
As is the case in many regulatory issues in Israel, cable television
regulations, which are the toughest to enforce, are the most detailed. It is
particularly interesting that such detail and so much thought was put into
issues of public concern and political speech, considering the law forbids
cable companies from broadcasting national news and that, according to
their mandate, their news programs are to deal mainly with local issues.
The Telecommunications Law under which cable television operates is si-
lent on the issue. Thus, the cable council chose to create the following
rules: (1) a franchise holder will refrain from expressing, through his own
productions, his private opiion;4 (2) a franchise holder will ensure ade-
quate balance so that prevailing opinions will be given in broadcasts that
30. Second Authority for Television and Radio Law, 1990, S.H. 59, art. 5(b)(6), (7).
31. Id. art. 47.
32. Second Authority Regulations (Ethics in Television and Radio Broadcasts), 1994,
K.T. 5580, 636, art. 7.
33. Id. art. 5.
34. Telecommunications Regulations (Broadcasts by a Franchise Operator) (amend.),
1991, K.T. 5397,429, art. 6(12)(a).
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have a public significance;35 (3) at least two opinions on an issue should be
presented; 36 (4) the presentation of the two opinions should be equal in
time and in form of presentation;37 and (5) in the absence of the opportu-
nity to bring competing viewpoints, the public should be notified that such
a request was made and denied by the other party. These rules pertain to
disagreements among public authorities within the region or between local
and national authorities. 9 Thus, within the cable television arena, the arena
least regulated for content by the law (and rightly if scarcity is the justifi-
cation for content regulation), the strictest limitations are set on license
holders.
B. Court Interpretations of Fairness in Political Speech
An analysis of the freedom of access to media in Israel completed in
the middle of the 1980s reached the conclusion that the fairness doctrine
may have already become part of the Israeli legal system in its original
American form.40 At least a half dozen more cases mentioning the fairness
doctrine have reached the Supreme Court since and have changed the pic-
ture somewhat. It is no longer doubtful, but in fact certain, that there is a
fairness doctrine in Israeli law, and that Israeli courts perceive it to be
similar to or at least based on the American concept. However, it is doubt-
ful whether it really is the same doctrine that existed in the American sys-
tem.
The political speech aspect of the doctrine was first introduced in
1981 in Shiran v. Israel Broadcasting Authority.4' The case dealt with the
upcoming broadcast of a historical television series about Zionism, the lib-
eration movement of the Jewish people that spearheaded the effort leading
to the creation of the State of Israel, called The Pillar of Fire. A group of
intellectuals of Middle Eastern Jewish descent claimed the series misrepre-
sented the contribution of their ancestors to the history of Jewish yearning
for Zion and asked the High Court of Justice to prevent the broadcast. The
court rejected this request citing previous decisions in which freedom of
35. Id. art. 10(a).
36. Id. art. 10(b)(1).
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 10(b)(2).
39. Id. art. 10(b)(3).
40. Dafna Barak, Freedom of Access to the Media-Balancing Interests Within the
Right for Freedom of Speech, 12 IYUNEY MIsHPAT 183 (1987) (in Hebrew).
41. H.C. 1/81, Shiran v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 35(1) P.D. 365.
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speech had been safeguarded. In reference to the fairness doctrine cited by
the petitioners, Justice Shamgar claimed that the doctrine was irrelevant to
the petition. The fairness doctrine does not award the court the power of
censorship; rather it requires that another aspect of the issue should be pre-
sented. It cannot therefore serve as justification for a move to censor the
broadcast.42 The actual issue of the acceptance of the doctrine into Israeli
law was thus left unanswered.
The following year, in Zichroni v. Israel Broadcasting Authority, a
decision made by the Broadcasting Authority to ban all interviews with
supporters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the territories oc-
cupied by the Israeli Defense Forces was questioned.43 The court annulled
the Authority's decision, but in the process, Justice Bach and probably
Justice D. Levin were under the impression that the American fairness
doctrine is part of Israeli law.45
In a groundbreaking decision of the High Court of Justice concerning
freedom of expression, the court in Kahane v. Israel Broadcasting Author-
ity acknowledged racist speech as a protected form of speech, as long As
the racist speech does not present imminent danger to public safety.46 In
Kahane, the court was asked to void a decision of the Broadcasting
Authority not to broadcast the views and opinions of the racist Kach party,
elected to the Knesset in 1984. The Authority, carefully working around
the court decision in the Zichroni case, decided only factual information
about the party would be broadcast, and the party's right of reply would be
limited to instances in which views that are not its own are attributed to
it.47 The Authority forbade any broadcast of the party's racist platform, in-
cluding its response to criticism of its views by other parties.
Justice Barak avoided questioning the existence or the scope of the
fairness doctrine in Israeli law.4 Following that detour, Justice Barak said
it is enough to state that, as a public authority, the IBA must abide by the
principles of administrative law, which include practicing equality and
fairness toward opinions and views.49 This conclusion cannot be derived
42. Id. at 378.
43. H.C. 243/82, Zichroni v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 37(1) P.D. 757.
44. Id. at 784.
45. Id. at 777.
46. H.C. 399/85, Kahane v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 41(3) P.D. 255, 281, 285.
47. Id. at 262-63.
48. Id. at 302.
49. Id.
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from the Broadcasting Authority Law itself, which specifically refrains
from requiring equality when claiming adequate expression of opinions is
needed. Thus, Justice Barak bypassed the Broadcasting Authority Law,
choosing instead to apply principles he imported from administrative law
of which fairness is an integral part. In addition, Justice Barak was trou-
bled by the elimination of the Kach party's right of reply, which he
deemed unfair, when other parties were allowed to criticize its views. 0 His
conclusion, thus, was to deem the Authority's action void.
In 1990, the Israeli Association for the Prevention of Smoking peti-
tioned the High Court of Justice,5 requesting that the Broadcasting
Authority provide it with free airtime to counter the episodic appearance of
52advertisements for cigarettes in sporting events. The court's opinion,
authored by Justice Barak, rejected the petition, stating that, without ques-
tioning the doctrine itself, the IBA's efforts to prevent such broadcasts
should be enough, and these incidental appearances of the advertisements
did not create a right for the petitioners that may emanate from the doc-
trine had it existed.
Even though the court was reluctant in the 1980s to declare the ad-
mission of the doctrine in Israeli law, in a major decision on the eve of the
1992 elections, the court all but announced that the doctrine was part of Is-
raeli law.53 By then, the political speech aspect had long been eliminated
by the FCC in the United States. In Zvili v. Chairman of the Central Elec-
tion Committee, Justice Barak accepted the stand of the Chairman of the
Central Election Committee, Supreme Court Justice Halima. s4 Justice Ha-
lima wrote that, in a broadcast concerning a political issue, an opportunity
should be granted during the broadcast or soon thereafter to present the full
range of political opinions. In support, Justice Barak deduced the princi-
ples of equality and fairness from the Election Propaganda Law, from the
50. Following the Kahane decision, Israeli law was changed and racist parties were
banned from participating in the elections, thus eliminating the problem of having their
ideas being regarded as prevalent.
51. H.C. 2868/90, Israeli Society for the Prevention of Smoking v. Israeli Broadcasting
Authority, 46(1) P.D. 163.
52. Advertising is forbidden in the Broadcasting Authority's broadcasts, and advertis-
ing for tobacco products is illegal on radio and television. Thus, the petition referred to in-
cidents where the camera may have "caught" an advertisement in a foreign stadium.
53. H.C. 869/92, Zvili v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee, 46(2) P.D. 692.
54. Id. at711.
55. Id. at 698.
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general duty of the Broadcasting Authority to provide ,equality in its
56broadcasts based on administrative law, and from the fairness doctrine.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Israeli Bar Association
was taken to court in 1993 for refusing to publish an opinion piece written
by a member of an opposition party in the Bar Association Newsletter, the
court no longer questioned the actual existence of the doctrine.57 In fact,
the court only questioned whether the Bar Association Newsletter was a
public forum to which the fairness doctrine should be applied. Chief Jus-
tice Shamgar rewrote the fairness doctrine, applying it to public rather than
private media and disregarded the broadcast-print dichotomy more closely
associated with the doctrine.5 8 Chief Justice Shamgar's opinion remained
the minority opinion,59 but his belief that the doctrine lives in the Israeli
legal system despite its elimination in the United States was accepted by
both Justices Strassberg-Cohen and Bach.6W Justice Strassberg-Cohen went
so far as to state that the concentration of the Israeli print media may jus-
tify imposing the doctrine on it as well, based upon the balancing as op-
posed to the issue-raising factor.61 This conclusion is itself dramatic, as
lower courts62 and scholars6' have concluded that the doctrine is nonexist-
ent for the print media. It sits well, though, with Chief Justice Barak's no-
tion that a mass circulation newspaper is not only a private asset but a
public stage or forum, and therefore, the person owning it must act as the
public's trustee. 6 As a result, Chief Justice Barak suggests as an idea for
discussion that fairness may be legislated and required of the printed press
as well. Negbi adds that a legal obligation on all media to offer access to
56. Id. at711.
57. H.C. 6218/93, Cohen v. Israel Bar Ass'n, 49(2) P.D. 538.
58. Id. at 547.
59. Id. at 556. Chief Justice Shamgar thought the fairness doctrine should be applied to
the specific case at hand.
60. Id. at 557, 571.
61. Id. at572.
62. Jerusalem Peace Court Civil Case 5808/88, Dr. Mubarak Awad v. nan Bachar
(unpublished decision).
63. ZEEv SEGAL, FREEDOM OF THE PREss-BETwEEN MYTH AND REALrrY 24-26 (1996)
(in Hebrew).
64. Aharon Barak, The Tradition of Freedom of Expression in Israel and Its Problems,
9 JUST. 3, 8-10. (1996).
65. Moshe Negbi, The Enemy Within: The Effect of "Private Censorship" on Press
Freedom and How to Confront It-An Israeli Perspective 15, Paper Published by the Joan
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, Discussion Paper D-35 (Nov. 1998).
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a wide spectrum of views is the appropriate way to counter publisher con-
66trol over content in Israel's small newspaper market.
The doctrine's idea of providing a fair forum for the expression of
opposing ideas appears in Israeli Supreme Court decisions even where the
doctrine as such is not mentioned. Such was the decision in Society for the
Public's Right to Know v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority.67 The plaintiffs
opposed the appearance of personal-view programs on public television.
Eventually, the Authority explained that the personal views would not be
limited to a particular journalist's views.6' This explanation satisfied the
plaintiffs, and they withdrew their case.
69
The latest instance in which the doctrine was declared alive was in
Novik v. Second Authority for Radio and Television.0 The appellants tried
to prevent a commercial television franchisee, acting under the auspices of
the Second Authority, from broadcasting a documentary that accused the
Israeli right wing of conspiring to assassinate Prime Minister Yizhak
Rabin.7 1 The court's decision, delivered by Justice Matza, stated that the
commercial channel's franchise holders are bound by the duties imposed
on them by forbidden broadcasts law and by ethical rules.72 Justice Matza
stated, "[t]his is a system of rules reflecting the 'fairness doctrine' (as
named by Justice Shamgar in the Shiran case) and that is worthy of any re-
spected medium.' 73 Thus, Justice Matza interprets the Second Authority
rules as if they have been designed to reflect the logic of the fairness doc-
trine.
C. Written Law and Regulations: Personal Attacks
In the absence of a central regulatory body, as explained above, the
personal attack rule in Israel has taken different forms in the different me-
dia institutions. The personal attack rule appears in three levels: in law, in
66. Id. at 15-17.
67. H.C. 4453/95, Society for the Public's Right to Know v. Israeli Broadcasting
Authority (unpublished decision).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. H.C. 2888/97, Novik v. Second Authority for Radio & Television (unpublished
decision that may be found in 97 TAKDin ELYON 510).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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administrative regulations, and in internal guidelines. In addition, it has
been imposed on broadcasters by the courts. 74
The legal provision dealing with the right of reply is article 47(b) of
the Second Authority for Radio and Television Law.75 The article states
that the council needs to set rules concerning the right of reply to those
who may have been harmed or might be directly harmed by the broad-
casts.76 The council enacted the required regulations n with the following
principles: (1) a comment of a person who may be harmed by a broadcast
should be sought in advance and broadcast together with the harming
broadcast; 7s (2) a comment of a person who may be seriously harmed by a
broadcast should be sought in a reasonable period of time in advance and
adequate time should be provided for the offended to appear in the broad-
cast and present his or her case;79 (3) a person harmed (and not contacted
beforehand) may request the franchise holder to broadcast his reply within
a reasonable period of time;' ° (4) a person seriously harmed (and not con-
tacted beforehand) may demand to appear in a broadcast set in a time and
receiving prominence as the original harming broadcast;81 and (5) the
broadcaster has the right to decide (in both serious and nonserious cases)
whether to broadcast the reply and in what format. One possible reason not
to broadcast the reply would be if the harming materials were factually
true. 2
The Cable Television Council formulated a different set of rules with
different emphases. Originally, in the council regulations published in
1987, the rule was that a franchise owner will broadcast a succinct notice
concerning the reaction of a person wishing to contradict the truthfulness
of factual information about himself that has already been broadcast.8' In
74. It is important to note here that providing the right of reply is considered a measure
of innocence in the Israeli defamation law, but that aspect of the law, which is not limited to
media, will not be dealt with in this Article.
75. Second Authority for Television and Radio Law, 1990, S.H. 59, art. 47(b).
76. Id.
77. Second Authority Regulations (Ethics in Television and Radio Broadcasts), 1994,
K.T. 5580, 636.
78. Id. art. 10(a).
79. Id. art. 10(e).
80. Id. art. 10(b).
81. Id. art. 10(f).
82. Id. art. 10(c), (g).
83. Telecommunications Regulations (Broadcasts by a Franchise Operator), 1987, K.T.
5064, 138, art. 10.
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
1991, the council amended its regulations and added the following provi-
sions: "The harmed person is not confined to contradict the truthfulness of
the information but may also add information that could set the facts in a
'considerably different light.' ' 4
The franchise holder is required to broadcast the reply in a similar
broadcast, as close in time to the original as possible. 85 Still, the franchise
holder was left with the discretion to time the length of the reply or not to
broadcast the reply at all when the broadcaster feared abuse of the right of
reply or when the reply itself seemed to be untrue.1
6
The Israel Broadcasting Authority, free to regulate itself, has for
many years held the right of reply within its own guidelines. As of 1997,
these particular guidelines became officially published regulations.87 This
was the outcome of court deliberations in a series of petitions whose aim
was, among other things, to have the Authority make all of its guidelines
part of the official public record.88 The Authority agreed to publish, and
subsequently did, only that part of the guidelines it deemed had an effect
on the well-being of the public by providing the public specific rights in
relation to the Authority's broadcasts. The rules outlined the following
principles: (1) the right of reply was granted broadly to all that may be
harmed;' 9 (2) the Authority was left with the discretion not to broadcast a
reply if it was found to be unworthy of broadcast or if it abused the right of
reply;90 (3) in case a reply could not be received prior to the broadcast, the
Authority found itself bound to notify the public of this fact and to allow
the injured to reply later;9' and (4) the Authority also provided its Om-
budsman with the right to order broadcast of a reply that the editorial staff
had rejected.92
84. Telecommunications Regulations (Broadcasts by a Franchise Operator) (amend.),
1991, K.T. 5397, 429, art. 11 (a).
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 11(b).
87. Broadcasting Authority Regulations (Right of Reply), 1997, K.T. 5816, 466.
88. H.C. 1397/95, 1732/95, 7735/95, Greenboim v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority
(unpublished decision that may be found in 96(1) TAKDIN ELYON 236).
89. Broadcasting Authority Regulations (Right of Reply), 1997, K.T. 5816, 466, art. 2.
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 3.
92. Id. art. 4.
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These rules live alongside the internal guidelines of the Authority in
which the issue of personal attacks and the right of reply are mentioned.9
The guidelines, rewritten in 1995, state that if a participant in a broadcast
has severely hurt the dignity of another participant or nonparticipant in the
broadcast, the attack should be edited from the broadcast.94 These types of
attacks should also be prevented in live broadcasts when possible. The ob-
ligation to correct wrong information should be fulfilled as close as possi-
ble to the broadcast of that information.95
D. Court Interpretations of the Scope of the Personal Attack Rule
The personal attack rule, though not immediately, has also entered
the Israeli courtroom using the American fairness doctrine. The idea of
providing an injured person with a right of reply was first mentioned in
96
"Hachayim" Book Publishers v. Broadcasting Authority. Justices H. Co-
hen and Elon on the one hand, and Justice Ben Porat on the other, differed
over the question of whether the power of television alone granted the ap-
pellants the right of reply they could not obtain based solely on defamation
law.97 All of the justices agreed that such a right existed regardless of the
power rationale. Justice Cohen stated that although the court lacked the ju-
risdiction to force the Authority to broadcast the reply, it should do so
based on its "intelligent discretion."98 Justice Elon thought that fair play
and good taste rendered such a right,99 and Justice Ben Porat stated that
"criticism invites a reply";10° and, thus, if the appellant wishes to reply to
the accusations, it should be granted that right. Still, all three justices left
this rule to the discretion of the Authority and denied the petition.
Following Hachayim, the courts were required to discuss the right of
reply in connection with the fairness doctrine on two occasions involving
television consumer programs. In M.IL.N. v. Israel Broadcasting Author-
ity, Justice Ben Porat stated: "It is obvious, that at the same time the sense
of justice provides, whether according to the 'fairness doctrine' and
93. See ROGEL & SCHEFrER, supra note 26.
94. Id. at 31.
95. Id. at 15.
96. C.A. 7/79, "Hachayim" Book Publishers v. Broadcasting Authority, 35(2) P.D.
365.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 368.
99. Id. at 369.
100. Id. at 370.
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whether without it, to give the first plaintiff a proper opportunity to re-
spond."1 °1
Supreme Court President Shamgar, presiding over Eldori v. Israel
Broadcasting Authority, questioned whether the right of reply still existed
nine years after a degrading program was broadcast.'0 In his analysis, Jus-
tice Shamgar brought up the fairness doctrine as a set of rules developed in
the United States in order to ensure the public's right to receive full and
varied information and to prevent the arbitrariness of broadcasters' deci-
sions.'03 Information is as full as possible, he states, when a reply is along-
side criticism.1°4 In this particular case, however, because of the time that
had passed between the broadcast and the court proceedings, Justice
Shamgar found that there was no substance in implementing "an analogous
rule to the fairness doctrine."
10 5
Thus, the Israeli courts have not had an opportunity to question the
application of the different right of reply rules that have emerged in the Is-
raeli media regulatory regime over the years. Still, they have found a
strong connection between application of the rule and its American coun-
terpart, the fairness doctrine.
V. SURVIVING THE "AMERICAN WIND": THE NATURE OF THE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE UNDER ISRAELI LAW
It is indisputable that the fairness doctrine, born and bred in the
American legal system, has been adopted, at least by name, into the Israeli
legal system. At the same time, it is as certain that the nature of what Is-
raelis call the fairness doctrine is very different from the original concept.
Not only has the original doctrine been eliminated in the United States
while continuing to thrive in Israel, it also looks very different from the
way it looked when it still lived in the United States. In the words of Su-
preme Court President Shamgar in Cohen v. Israel Bar Association,'0
6
"[c]hanges in the direction of the wind in the United States need not shake
the branches of the trees in this land.' 'l 7
101. H.C. 259/84, M.I.L.N. v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 38(2) P.D. 673, 686.
102. H.C. 76/89, Eldori v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 34(1) P.D. 798.
103. Id. at 801.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. H.C. 6218/93, Cohen v. Israel Bar Ass'n, 49(2) P.D. 538.
107. Id. at 544.
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The political speech aspect of the doctrine has taken a very different
road than the original. This different path should be seen in the context in
which the doctrine was first brought into the Israeli system. Cases like
Shiran,0 8 Zichroni,'09 and Kahane"° were dealt with when the IBA was Is-
rael's sole broadcaster. The fairness doctrine was thus imposed on it be-
cause it was the only broadcaster and was consequently scrutinized for its
obligations as a public organization. The ideological basis for the ruling
was unclear. It was not based on spectrum scarcity, as in the United States,
but rather on broadcaster scarcity. Moreover, the fairness the broadcaster
was required to practice was not a broadcaster's fairness but a public
authority's fairness. In other words, Israeli Supreme Court justices sought
an American solution to a system that looked more European-European
solutions may have been more applicable.
As a result, in Cohen, the Court discussed the doctrine at length, even
though the case dealt with a print publication, a contradiction to the
American system.' The dichotomy created was not between broadcast
and print media, but between public and private media. Even though the
Court had decided in the end to reject Cohen's request, the mere fact that it
was given such long consideration implies that a different conclusion is
possible. This is also possible due to the prominence of Chief Justice
Barak in the Supreme Court and his informal thoughts on the issue.1
The Israeli courts chose to interpret the issue of fairness in broadcast
media through a set of rules similar to those in the United States. This may
be an appealing thought if one bases the whole system on the American
idea of free speech, but this is not the way Israeli legislators and regulators
see the media, and it does not resonate with their rules and laws.
The idea of free speech was imported into the Israeli system through
a series of court decisions that the Knesset never challenged. In the case
of the adoption of the fairness doctrine into the Israeli system, the assump-
tions the courts made were wrong. While the Israeli system does provide
for a rule of fairness in its broadcast media, it is not the same fairness the
American system provides, but rather the one the continental systems pro-
108. H.C. 1/81, Shiran v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 35(1) P.D. 365.
109. H.C. 243/82, Zichroni v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 37(1) P.D. 757.
110. H.C. 399/85, Kahane v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 41(3) P.D. 255.
111. H.C. 6218/93, Cohen v. Israel Bar Ass'n, 49(2) P.D. 538.
112. Barak, supra note 64, at 3.
113. Historically, freedom of speech was declared a part of the system in the landmark
decision of H.C. 73/53, Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871.
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vide-the concept of impartiality. Israeli broadcasters cannot editorialize
or promote their own political beliefs in any way. They are obliged to pre-
sent opinions prevalent in society, which have nothing to do with their
own.
Israeli fairness cannot be interpreted the American way because it did
not develop on the same constitutional grounds. Freedom of speech or of
the press is not safeguarded by the nonexistent Israeli constitution or by
the base laws enacted in order to serve as its building blocks. Thus, fair-
ness, or the provision of a forum to another during airtime a broadcaster
lawfully has discretion over as to content, does not seem to obstruct free
speech. What emanates, therefore, is that the Israeli system enforces fair-
ness on broadcasters, and perhaps other media as well. This is justified on
the grounds that it provides free speech to the underrepresented. The
broadcaster is never referred to as someone whose own rights have been
breached. The attempt, therefore, to name Israeli broadcast impartiality as
fairness is conceptually wrong. Nothing has been taken from broadcasters;
no constitutional freedom has been breached; and the regulation of broad-
casting is designed around a completely different logic.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a growing "McDonaldization" of public life in Israel. Party
and ideological politics have been replaced by direct personal elections.
Ideological election platforms and heated controversy have been taken
over by soundbyte politics. Western values have been enforced on a soci-
ety that has not yet willfully adopted the basic tenets of the enlightenment.
The adoption of the fairness doctrine into Israeli law is another ex-
ample of this phenomenon. Although it has been almost two decades since
the doctrine was first mentioned as an idea to be attended to by the legal
system, no deep discussion of its proper place within the system has taken
place. Despite the lack of deep discussion, fairness became a superficial
element in a system that has yet to fully embrace such basic values as free-
dom of speech, press, and expression. Because the system adopted its su-
perficial form, its deeper importance goes unnoticed. All prevalent opin-
ions feel safeguarded by it, and those underrepresented tend to create
alternative, and sometimes illegal, forms of media in which fairness is not
even a faint dream. Because there was never discussion of its actual exis-
tence in the system, the possible downside of the doctrine that brought it
down in its country of origin has also been disregarded.
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The Israeli legal system needs a shake up in the way rules pertaining
to freedom of expression have been implemented. A rethinking of the fair-
ness doctrine and a rewriting of its rules so that they serve the system they
are written in is by now a must.

